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Yao Liu and Arijit Mukherjee 
 
Abstract: 
Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay 
much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalisation in the presence 
of labour unions. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalisation on the 
final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionised wage and 
imports intermediate goods from another country. We show that trade liberalisation on the 
intermediate goods (final goods) increases (reduces) the unionised wage, labour union’s 
utility and the domestic profit. Trade liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate 
goods may either increase or reduce the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
the domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our 
qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the 
pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producer, the union’s objective function and input 
substitution, yet they affect the results quantitatively. 
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The general belief is that trade liberalisation benefits the consumers and increases welfare of the 
importing country, yet there is concern about its effect on the workers. While the earlier papers have 
mainly concentrated on competitive labour markets, recent works focus on labour market imperfection 
due to the presence of labour unions. The concern about the effect of trade liberalisation on unionised 
wage is more severe in countries such as Europe, where the presence of labour unions is prominent in 
many countries. This concern has created significant interest in this topic. However, to our surprise, the 
literature did not pay much attention to the import of intermediate goods, while a large part of total world 
trade is on intermediate goods, and the proportion has been growing continuously.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to show the effects of trade liberalisation on final goods and/or 
intermediate goods in the presence of labour union. We show that the effects of trade liberalisation on 
an import competing industry depend on whether trade liberalisation is on the final goods market and/or 
the intermediate goods. In this respect, the technology of the firms, which affect the input coefficients, 
may play an important role. More specifically, considering that the domestic firm pays unionised wage 
and imports intermediate goods from another country, we show that trade liberalisation on the 
intermediate goods (final goods) increases (reduces) the unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the 
domestic profit. Trade liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase 
or reduce the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit depending on the 
input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Hence, the technologies of the firms, which affect the input 
coefficients, may be important factors in determining the effects of trade liberalisation if trade 
liberalisation is viewed broadly to include tariff reduction on both the final goods and the intermediate 
goods. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure (i.e., 
perfectly competitive, monopolistic or firm-specific), the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods 
producer (i.e., uniform pricing or price discrimination), the union’s objective function and input 
substitution (fixed or flexible input-coefficient technologies), yet they affect the results quantitatively.  
 The Effects of Trade Liberalisation in a Vertical Structure 
1. Introduction 
The general belief is that trade liberalisation benefits the consumers and increases welfare of 
the importing country, yet there is concern about its effect on the workers. The seminal paper 
by Stolper and Samuelson (1941) showing the effects of a product-price change on factor 
prices creates substantial interest on this topic. However, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) 
consider perfectly competitive factor markets, while the real world situation is often different. 
For example, the presence of labour unions often creates imperfection in the labour markets, 
which encourages more recent works to examine the effects of trade liberalisation on 
unionised wage and employment. The concern about the effect of trade liberalisation on 
unionised wage is more severe in countries such as Europe, where the presence of labour 
unions is prominent in many countries.
1  
Rodrik (1997) points out that globalisation reduce the power of the trade unions and 
create an adverse wage effect. As documented in Niblett (2005), the negative perception in 
the European Union towards increased globalisation is an important reason for the rejection 
of the European Constitution by French and Dutch voters. The theoretical results of Huizinga 
                                                            
1 Union agreements cover over 67% of workforce on average in the European Nations, while it covers 14% in the USA 
(OECD, 2004).  
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 (1993) and Sørensen (1993), which show that unionised wage is higher under autarky than 
under free trade, confirm this concern. 
However, there are other views, which suggest that trade liberalisation may increase 
unionised wage. The factors attributed to the beneficial wage effect of trade liberalisation are 
two-way trade liberalisation (Naylor, 1998 and 1999, Munch and Skaksen, 2002 and Bastos 
and Kreickemeier, 2009), efficient union-firm bargaining
2 (Gaston and Trefler, 1995), 
Bertrand competition (Gūrthzgen, 2002), open shop unions (Bastos et al., 2009), formal-
informal productions (Maiti and Mukherjee, 2010) and endogenous domestic market 
structure (Mukherjee, 2010). The empirical evidence on this topic, although scarce, is also 
mixed (see, Gaston and Trefler, 1995 and Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995). 
Although the above mentioned papers provide interesting insights, they ignore an 
important empirical regularity, viz. trade in intermediate goods. It is well known that a large 
part of total world trade is on intermediate goods and the proportion has been growing 
continuously. During 1975-1985, 50% of developing countries’ imports were accounted for 
intermediate inputs (López and Panagariya 1992). According to World Trade Organization 
(2009), trade in intermediate goods (excluding fuel) was 40% of total world trade. Although 
vertical specialisation and international trade in intermediate goods is the focus of many 
recent theoretical and empirical studies, such as Ardnt (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 
                                                            
2  The efficient bargaining model, which stipulates that the firms and the unions bargain over wages and 
employment, is an alternative to the right-to-manage model, where the firms and unions bargain only over 
wages. See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favour of the right-to-manage models.  
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 b), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2003 and 
2005), Chen et al. (2004) and Yi (2003), to name a few,
3 little attention has been paid to 
determine the effects trade liberalisation in the presence of trade in intermediate goods and 
labour union. This paper is a step to fills this gap. 
We show that the effects of trade liberalisation on an import competing industry depend 
on whether trade liberalisation is on the final goods market and/or the intermediate goods. In 
this respect, the technology of the firms, which affect the input coefficients, may play an 
important role. More specifically, considering that the domestic firm pays unionised wage 
and imports intermediate goods from another country, we show that trade liberalisation on the 
intermediate goods (final goods) increases (reduces) the unionised wage, labour union’s 
utility and the domestic profit. Trade liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate 
goods may either increase or reduce the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
the domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Hence, the 
technologies of the firms, which affect the input coefficients, may be important factors in 
determining the effects of trade liberalisation if trade liberalisation is viewed broadly to 
include tariff reduction on both the final goods and the intermediate goods. Our qualitative 
results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure (i.e., perfectly 
competitive, monopolistic or firm-specific),
4 the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods 
                                                            
3 See Sanyal and Jones (1982) for an earlier work on international trade in intermediate goods. 
4  As we mention below, the assumption of perfectly competitive intermediate goods market and monopoly 
3 
 producer (i.e., uniform pricing or price discrimination), the union’s objective function and 
input substitution (fixed or flexible input-coefficient technologies), yet they affect the results 
quantitatively.  
It may worth pointing out that, although Gaston and Trefler (1995) and Gūrthzgen 
(2002) show that unilateral trade liberalisation may either increase or decrease unionised 
wage, our reason is different from theirs. Unlike Gaston and Trefler (1995), the labour union 
in our analysis determines only wage and not employment. Unlike Gūrthzgen (2002), we 
consider Cournot competition in the final goods market. Trade liberalisation on the 
intermediate goods is important for our results. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is one more paper by Amiti and Davis (2008), which 
considers wage effects of trade liberalisation on both the final goods and the intermediate 
goods. However, they ignore all the strategic aspects considered in our paper. More 
specifically, our paper differs from their work in the following important ways. First, they 
consider perfect labour market with fair wage, while labour market is imperfectly competitive 
in our analysis. Wage in our analysis is determined by the labour union (or by bargaining 
between the firm and the labour union), which may give same or different weights on 
employment and wage. Hence, unlike us, they ignore strategic wage determination. Second, 
their consideration of monopolistic competition in the final goods market ignores strategic 
interaction in the product market. Third, competitive intermediate goods market in their 
analysis ignores strategic choice by the intermediate goods producers. Finally, unlike them, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
intermediate goods producer can have different interpretations. If there are symmetric intermediate goods 
producers with power and competing in prices with no capacity constraint, it will generate results similar to a 
perfectly competitive intermediate goods market. On the other hand, if these intermediate goods producers fully 
cooperate to their pricing strategies, it will generate outcomes similar to monopoly intermediate goods producer. 
4 
 we also show the effects of endogenous technology choice in the final goods market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model 
and derives the results under perfectly competitive intermediate goods market. We extend the 
model in Section 3 to consider market power of the intermediate goods producers. Section 4 
discusses the implications of different utility functions of the labour union and the effects of 
technology choice. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The basic model 
There are two firms D  and  F, located in the countries, called domestic and foreign 
respectively. These firms compete in the domestic country like Cournot duopolists. The 
inverse demand function in the domestic country is  D F PaQ Q = −−, where  D Q  and   are 
the outputs of firms D and F respectively. 
F Q
Both firms require an intermediate good and labour for production. Assume that firms 
D and F have similar technologies. Each of them requires δ  units of the intermediates good 
and λ  workers to produce one unit of the output. We assume that both firms purchase the 
intermediate good from world suppliers, which are located either in the foreign country or in 
a third country that is different from both the domestic and the foreign countries. We assume 
that labour market in the domestic country is unionised, whereas the labour market in the 
foreign country is perfectly competitive. The reservation wages for the workers in the 
5 
 domestic and in the foreign countries are respectively d and , where
 
F w F dw
≥
<
, and the 
marginal cost of production for the intermediate goods is c.  
We assume that the domestic country has imposed a per-unit tariff T on the output of 
firm F and a per-unit tariff t on firm D’s import of the intermediate goods. If the intermediate 
goods producers are from the foreign country, it is then trivial that there is no tariff imposed 
by the foreign country on the intermediate goods. However, we assume for simplicity that 
even if the intermediate goods producers are from a third country, there is no tariff on firm 
F’s import of the intermediate goods.
5  
To show the effects of domestic trade liberalisation, we start our analysis with a 
perfectly competitive intermediate goods sector. Alternatively, we can consider that several 
symmetric intermediate goods producers with market powers compete in prices with no 
capacity constraint. The latter situation will generate outcome similar to a perfectly 
competitive intermediate goods sector. As an example, consider Intel and AMD supply 
processors to the computer manufacturers and compete in prices with no capacity constraint. 
We consider the following game. At stage 1, the price of the intermediate good and the 
wages are determined simultaneously. Given that the foreign labour market and the 
intermediate goods market are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium wage in the foreign 
country and the equilibrium price of the intermediate goods are trivially set to   and c  F w
                                                            
5 Since we are interested in determining the effects of domestic country’s trade liberalisation, a positive tariff 
rate on firm F’s import of the intermediate goods does not affect our result. 
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 respectively. Hence, the effective choice is made by the domestic labour union. At stage 2, 
firms D and F determine their outputs simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve 
the game through backward induction. 
Given the foreign wage and the price of the intermediate goods as   and  c 
respectively, the profits of firms D and F are respectively 
F w
  () D D Pw c t Q πλ δ =− − + ⎡ ⎣ D ⎤ ⎦           ( 1 a )  
[ ] FF Pw c T Q πλ δ =− −− F .               (1b) 








2 T λ λδδ −+ − − +







2 T λ λδ δ −+ − + −
= ,              (2b) 
where the superscript pc represents perfect competition in the intermediate goods market. 
Domestic labour union determines  D w  to maximise a simple Stone-Geary type utility 
function:
6 
() D D Q Uwd λ =− .                ( 3 )  
                                                            
6 We will show in the following sections that the qualitative effects of trade liberalisation are the same under 
different market structure of the intermediate goods and the pricing behaviours of the intermediate goods 
producers. However, for simplicity, all the results are derived under a simple union utility, where the union has 
full bargaining power and gives the same weight to wage and employment. Section 5 will show that our results 
are not the outcome of this simple union utility function, and the main conclusions hold under different utility 
functions of the domestic labour union. 
7 
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Proposition 1:  (i) If the intermediate goods market is perfectly competitive, domestic tariff 
reduction on the intermediate goods increases the unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
the domestic firm’s profit, but domestic tariff reduction on the final goods lowers the 
unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic firm’s profit. 
(ii) If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same amount on the final goods and on the 
intermediate goods, it increases (decreases) the unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
the domestic firm’s profit for () 1 / 2 δ >< . 
If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same proportion on the final goods and on 
the intermediate goods, it increases (decreases) the unionised wage, labour union’s utility 
and the domestic firm’s profit for () / 2 Tt δ >< .  
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The reasons for the above results are as follows. Ceteris paribus, a tariff reduction on 
the intermediates goods increases the domestic firm’s output, which increases the labour 
demand faced by the domestic labour union. The higher labour demand helps to increase the 
domestic unionised wage. On the other hand, ceteris paribus, a tariff reduction on the final 
goods increases the foreign firm’s output and reduces the output of the domestic firm. Hence, 
the domestic firm’s demand for labour falls and reduces the unionised wage. Hence, the 
“output effects” of tariff reductions are responsible for these results. 
If the domestic country reduces tariffs on both the final goods and the intermediate 
goods, the net effect of tariff reductions on the domestic unionised wage is determined by the 
relative strengths of the above-mentioned effects, which depend on the initial tariff levels (T, 
9 
 t) and the intermediate input coefficient (δ ). A relatively large δ  means a large share of the 
intermediate goods in the unit cost of the final goods. In this situation, the effect of trade 
liberalisation on the intermediate goods dominates the effect of trade liberalisation on the 
final goods due to the significant savings of the cost of production, thus increasing the 
unionised wage. 
It follows from (5a) that the qualitative effects of trade liberalisation will be the same 
on unionised wage, domestic employment and union utility. Hence, a tariff reduction on the 
intermediate goods increases the union utility by increasing both the unionised wage and 
domestic employment, while a tariff reduction on the final goods decreases the union utility 
by reducing both the unionised wage and domestic employment. Similarly, if the tariffs are 
reduced by same amount or by the same proportion on the intermediate goods and on the 
final goods, the value of δ   that makes the union utility unchanged following trade 
liberalisation will be the same to the value of δ  that makes the unionised wage unchanged. 
We have shown the above result under full bargaining power of the labour union, which 
gives the same weight on employment and wage. We will show in section 5 that similar 
conclusions will hold even if the labour union gives different weights to employment and 
wage, and the wage is determined by bargaining between the firm and the union. 
  
3. Market power of the intermediate goods producers 
10 
 Now we want to show the implications of market power of the intermediate goods producers. 
To show this, we will consider the following cases: (i) monopolist intermediate goods 
producer charging either uniform price or discriminatory prices to the final goods producers, 
and (ii) intermediate goods producers are specific to the final goods producers.  
 
3.1. Monopoly intermediate goods producer 
This section considers a world supplier of the intermediate goods, thus considering a situation 
opposite to Section 2, where the intermediate goods market is characterised by either perfect 
competition or price competition between the symmetric intermediate goods suppliers with 
market powers and no capacity constraint. Alternatively, we can assume in this section that 
symmetric intermediate goods producers with market power fully cooperate to their pricing 
strategies. For example, consider that either Intel is supplying processors to different 
computer manufacturers, or Intel and AMD are supplying processors to the computer 
manufacturers and also fully cooperating to the pricing for processors, thus creating an 
effective monopoly in the market for computer processors. 
Consider a monopoly intermediate goods producer for the following two situations: 
(i) where the intermediate goods producer charges a uniform price I p  to firms D and F, and 
(ii) where the intermediate goods producer charges discriminatory prices  D p  and  F p  to firms 
11 
 D and F respectively. For both the cases, we will consider the following game structure. At 
stage 1, the price of the intermediate good and the wages are determined simultaneously. 
Given that the foreign labour market is perfectly competitive, the equilibrium wage in the 
foreign country is trivially set to  . Hence, the effective choices are made by the 
intermediate goods producer and the domestic labour union. At stage 2, firms D and F 
determine their outputs simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve the game 
through backward induction. 
F w
 
3.1.1. Uniform pricing by the intermediate goods producer 
Given that the foreign wage as  , if the intermediate goods producer charges a uniform 
price, firms D and F determine their outputs to maximise the following expressions 
respectively: 
F w
() D DI Pw p t Q πλ δ =− − + ⎡ ⎣ D ⎤ ⎦             ( 6 a )  
[ ] FF I Pw p T Q πλ δ =− − − F .               (6b) 
Maximising the profit functions, we get the equilibrium outputs of firms D and F, 







λ I λδ δ −+ − +
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I t λ λδ −+ − −
=
δ +
,          (7b) 
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 where the superscript m represents the case of monopoly intermediate goods producer. 
  The intermediate goods producer and the domestic labour union maximise the 
following expressions simultaneously to determine  I p  and  D w  respectively: 
() ( D I I pc QQ πδ −+ = ) F                                                    (8) 
() D D Q Uwd λ =− .                    (9) 








T λ δλ δ
δ
−+ − − −
=                                     (10) 








++ − − +
= .          (11) 
Using (10) and (11), we get the union utility and the profit of the domestic firm, respectively, 
as: 
2
25 7 2 7 5 2
31 5
m F aw dct T
U
λλ δ δ +− − − + ⎛ = ⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟                                        (12a)
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aw dct T λλ δ δ
π
+− − − + ⎛ = ⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟ .                      (12b) 
   
Proposition 2: (i)  If the intermediate goods producer is a monopolist, a domestic tariff 
reduction on the intermediate goods (final goods) will increase (decrease) the domestic 
unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic firm’s profit. 
13 
 The marginal change of the unionised wage after tariff reduction on intermediate 
goods (final goods) is less (more) under a monopolist intermediate goods producer compared 
to the perfectly competitive intermediate goods market. But the situations for union utility and 
the domestic profit are ambiguous.  
(ii) If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same amount on the intermediate goods and the 
final goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
the domestic firm’s profit for  () 5 / 7 δ ><  (in  contrast  to  () 1 / 2 δ ><  under  perfectly 
competitive intermediate goods market). 
If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same proportion on the intermediate goods 
and the final goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s 
utility and the domestic firm’s profit for  () 5 / 7 Tt δ ><  (in contrast to  () / 2 Tt δ ><  under 
perfectly competitive intermediate goods market). 
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The “output effect” of tariff reduction, discussed in the previous section, remains in the 
presence of monopoly intermediate goods producer. However, the market power of the 
monopolist input producer creates further effects. If the domestic country reduces tariff of the 
final goods (intermediate goods), it reduces (increases) firm D’s output but increases 
(reduces) firm F’s output. However, the total outputs of firms D and F, and therefore, the 
total demand for the intermediate goods, increase following a tariff reduction either on the 
final goods or on the intermediate goods. This “market expansion” effect for the intermediate 
goods producer tends to increase the price of the intermediate goods following a tariff 
reduction either on the final goods or on the intermediate goods, as evident from equation 
(10). The negative effect of the higher intermediate goods price tends to reinforce the wage 
15 
 reduction effect of trade liberalisation on the final goods, but it tends to soften the wage 
increase effect of trade liberalisation on the intermediate goods, by increasing firm D’s 
marginal cost of production for a given domestic unionised wage. 
If the domestic country reduces tariffs on both the final goods and the intermediate 
goods, the negative effect of trade liberalisation on the intermediate goods price tends to 
reduce the unionised wage raising effect of trade liberalisation. Hence, the range of δ  over 
which tariff reduction on both the final goods and the intermediate goods reduce the domestic 
unionised wage is higher under monopoly intermediate goods producer with uniform pricing 
compared to the situation with a perfectly competitive intermediate goods market. 
The effects on the labour union’s utility and domestic profit follow similarly. 
 
3.1.2. Price discrimination by the intermediate goods producer 
Now consider price discrimination by the monopolist intermediate goods producer. The game 
structure is similar to Section 3.1.1 with the exception that the intermediate goods producer 
can charge different price to firms D and F. Hence, firms D and F pay  D p  and  F p  
respectively for the intermediate goods, and these prices are determined by maximising 
()() D IF DF pc c Qp Q π δδ + =− − . 
16 
 To avoid repetition, we skip the mathematical details. Instead, we report the 
equilibrium values and the effects of tariff reductions in Table 1. The inspection of Table 1 
and the comparison of these values with Propositions 1 and 2 give the following results 
immediately. 
 
Proposition 3: (i) For the case of price discrimination by the monopolist intermediate goods 
producer, trade liberalisation on the intermediate goods (final goods) will increase (reduce) 
the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and domestic profit. 
The marginal changes of the unionised wage due to tariff reductions are less under 
price discrimination compared to uniform pricing. But the situations for union utility and the 
domestic profit are ambiguous. 
(ii) If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same amount on the intermediate goods and the 
final goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and 
domestic profit for  () 1 2 δ ><  (in contrast to () 5 / 7 δ ><  under uniform pricing). 
If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same proportion on the intermediate goods 
and the final goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s 




 The possibility of price discrimination increases the monopolist intermediate goods 
producer's flexibility compared to uniform pricing. A tariff reduction on the intermediate 
goods increases domestic output and reduces output of the foreign firm. Hence, price 
discrimination increases the intermediate goods producer’s incentive for rent extraction from 
the domestic firm compared to the foreign firm, which reduces the domestic labour union’s 
incentive for rent extraction. In this situation, the unionised wage raising effect of a tariff 
reduction on the intermediate goods is lower compared to uniform pricing by the intermediate 
goods producer. 
A tariff reduction on the final goods reduces domestic output but increases foreign 
output. Therefore, it reduces the intermediate goods producer’s incentive for rent extraction 
from the domestic firm compared to the foreign firm, but it increases rent extraction by the 
union from the domestic firm. Hence, the unionised wage reduction following a tariff 
reduction on the final goods is lower under price discrimination compared to uniform pricing 
by the intermediate goods producer. 
If tariffs are reduced on the intermediate goods and on the final goods, both the above-
mentioned forces are in action, and reduce the range of δ  over which unionised wage falls 
compared to uniform pricing by the intermediate goods producer. 
The effects on the labour union’s utility and domestic profit follow similarly. 
 
18 
 3.2. Firm-specific intermediate goods producers 
Now we consider the case where the intermediate goods producers are specific to the final 
goods producers. Hence, assume that Intel and AMD are supplying processors to the specific 
computer manufacturers. 
The game structure is similar to Section 3.1 with the exception that firm-specific 
intermediate goods producers charge  D p  and  F p  to firms D and F respectively, and these 
prices are determined by maximising  ( ) ID 1 D Q pc π δ =−  and  () 2 IFQ pc F π δ =−  
simultaneously. 
The equilibrium values and the effects of tariff reductions are shown in Table 1, which 
confirm our qualitative results of the previous sections. The following proposition 
summarises results for the firm-specific intermediate goods producers. 
 
Proposition 4: (i) If the intermediate goods producers are firm-specific, domestic tariff 
reduction on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (lowers) the unionised wage, 
labour union’s utility and domestic profit.  
(ii) If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same amount on the final goods and on the 
intermediate goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s 
utility and domestic profit for () 2 / 7 δ >< . 
19 
 If the domestic tariffs are reduced by the same proportion on the final goods and on 
the intermediate goods, they increase (decrease) the domestic unionised wage, labour 
union’s utility and domestic profit for () 2 / 7 Tt δ >< . 
 
  The intuition for the above result is very much similar to the case of discriminatory 
prices charged by the monopolist intermediate good producer, with the exception that under 
firm-specific intermediate goods producers, the profit of the intermediate goods producer is 
coming only from the respective final goods producer. Hence, an intermediate goods 
producer does not care about the effect of its pricing strategy on the profitability of the other 
intermediate goods producer. Due to this difference in the intermediate goods producers’ 
objective functions, even if the qualitative results for tariff reductions on the unionised wage 
remain the same, the marginal change is larger under price discrimination compared to firm-
specific goods producers. 
  
4. Discussions 
So far, we have seen that the qualitative effects of trade liberalisation on the unionised wage 
are the same under different formulations. However, in all those analysis, we have considered 
a simple objective function of the union, which maximises the total union rent. 
20 
   Further, like the previous papers mentioned in the introduction, we have considered 
that the final goods producers use fixed input-coefficient technologies, and therefore, cannot 
adjust the input coefficients depending on the input prices. Even if the restrictions on the 
adjustments of input coefficients may approximate several real life situations, it may also 
reasonable to think that the firms have some amount of flexibilities in adjusting input 
coefficients.
7 
The purpose of this section is to see the implications of different objective functions 
of the labour union and variable coefficient technologies on our results.  
 
4.1. Implications of the union’s objective function 
To see the implications of different objective functions of the labour union, we will consider 
two cases: (i) the labour union gives different weights to wage and employment, and (ii) the 
union and the firm bargain for wage. Although a general model may consider these cases 
together, for analytical convenience, we will consider these cases separately. To show the 
implications of different objective functions of the labour union, we consider fixed-
coefficient technologies and a perfectly competitive intermediate goods market. The game 
structure is similar to Section 2. 
 
                                                            
7 See Warren-Boulton (1974), Mallela and Nahata (1980) and Hwang et al. (2007) for some works with variable 
coefficient technologies in different contexts. 
21 
 4.1.1. Different weights on wage and employment 
Here we consider that the union gives different weights to wage and employment, but has the 
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4.1.2. Union-firm bargaining 
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 Now consider the situation where the labour union gives the same weight to wage and 
employment, but bargains with firm D. Hence, the unionised wage is determined by 
maximising the following expression: 
  ()
1




− =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , where 01 β < < .           (17) 
Taking the equilibrium output of firm D from 2(a) and maximising the utility function (17) 
with respect to the unionised wage, we get that 
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Using the equilibrium wage, we get the equilibrium union utility and the domestic 
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23 
 Thus, we show that even if (i) the labour union gives different weights to wage and 
employment, and (ii) the union and the firm bargain for wage, our qualitative results of the 
previous sections remain. 
 
4.2. Input substitution 
Now we want to see the implications of variable coefficient technologies. To show the effects 
of input substitution, we assume a perfectly competitive intermediate goods market in this 
section. We also assume that the union has full bargaining power and give the same weight to 
wage and employment. 
The timing of game is as follows. At stage 1, the price of the intermediate good and the 
wages are determined simultaneously. Given that the foreign labour market and the 
intermediate goods market are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium wage in the foreign 
country and the equilibrium price of the intermediate goods are trivially set to   and c 
respectively. Hence, the effective choice is made by the domestic labour union. At stage 2, 
firms D and F determine their input combinations. At stage 3, firms D and F compete like 




 The equilibrium wage in the foreign country and the equilibrium price of the 
intermediate goods are trivially set to   and c respectively. Given the wages, the price of 
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D λ , 
*
D δ , 
*
F λ  and 
*
F δ  are the respective equilibrium input coefficients. 
Maximising the profit functions, we get the equilibrium outputs of firms D and F, 
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To consider input substitutability, we assume that both firms have the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, 
1 QL I
α α − = , where L is the worker and I is the intermediate good. The 
equilibrium input coefficients for firm D can be obtained by minimising ( ) DD D wc λδ ++ t  
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 Not surprisingly, the input coefficients are determined by the relative input prices. Given 
the constant wage in the foreign country and the constant price of the intermediate good, 
*
F λ , 
*
F δ  and the marginal cost of firm F, which is 
*
FF F w
* c λ δ + , are constant. Hence, effectively 
the effect of a tariff reduction is on the technology choice of firm D. 
Since the equilibrium wage in the foreign country and the equilibrium price of the 
intermediate goods are trivially set to   and c respectively, the effective choice at stage 1 is 
by the domestic labour union only. The equilibrium domestic unionised wage can be found 
by maximising the union utility 
F w
( ) D DD dQ λ =− Uw   with respect to D w . The following 
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It is immediate from (23) that a lower T reduces left hand side of (23), which implies that  D w  











Hence, a tariff reduction on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (decreases) the 




8  Although it is not possible for us to derive the analytical results for the effects of tariff reductions on union 
utility and domestic profit, we expect that, due to the same qualitative results of tariff reductions on the 
unionised wage under fixed and flexible technologies, the qualitative effects of tariff reductions on union utility 
and domestic profit would be the same under fixed and flexible technologies. The possibility of input 
26 
   Even if the qualitative effects of a tariff reduction on the unionised wage remains the 
same under input substitution, it is intuitive that the quantitative effect will be different from 
the case with no input substitution. Intuitively, the absolute marginal change should be less 
under input substitution compared to the fixed coefficient case. For example, in the case of no 
input substitution, a tariff reduction on the final goods will lower the domestic wage. 
However, the possibility of input substitution will then encourage the domestic firm to use 
more labour, since labour is now relatively cheaper than the intermediate goods. This 
“substitution effect” between the inputs tends to increase the unionised wage. We find that 
the “output effect” dominates the input substitution effect, and a tariff reduction on the final 
goods reduces the domestic unionised wage. However, due to the input substitution effect, the 
extent of wage reduction following a tariff reduction on the final goods is lower under input 
substitution compared to no input substitution.
 
Similarly, due to the input substitution, a tariff reduction on the intermediate goods 
will increase the domestic wage less under input substitution compared to no input 
substitution, because the more expensive labour is now being substituted with cheaper 
intermediate goods which tend to reduce the union’s labour demand and the unionised wage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
substitution will create lower absolute marginal change compared to the fixed coefficient technology. However, 
since the effect of input substitution is an indirect effect due to a change in the input price, thus second order in 
nature, we would expect the “output effect” to dominate the “substitution effect”.  
27 
 It is now intuitive that if tariff reduces on both the final goods and the intermediate goods, 
unionised wage may either increase or decrease, depending on the parameter values. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Many countries are liberalising their trade policies, which create concerns about their effects 
on the domestic labour markets. In a simple model we show how trade liberalisation on the 
final goods and/or the intermediate goods affect domestic unionised wage, union utility and 
the domestic profit through the output effect, market expansion effect for the intermediate 
goods producers and the input substitution effect under flexible technologies.  
We show that trade liberalisation only on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases 
(reduces) the domestic unionised wage, union’s utility and the domestic profit. Trade 
liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or reduce 
the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit depending on the 
input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to 
the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods 
producer, input substitution and the union’s objective function, since the output effect 




 Appendix A 
Table 1: The equilibrium values under price discrimination and firm-specific producers 
  price discrimination  firm-specific producers 
*
D p  
54 7
12 12




52 7 27 17
22 22





F p  
22











D w  
2 2
36




52 5 27 15
22 22
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